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THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ENGQUIST V. 
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: WHY THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE CHOSEN THE SCALPEL 
INSTEAD OF THE MEAT-AXE 
Christopher Cazenave* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, the Supreme Court, in its decision in Village of Willowbrook 
v. Olech,1 explicitly recognized an arguably different type of equal protec-
tion claim.2 While there is substantial support for the role of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as a restraint on unreasonable government classifications 
(i.e., legislative classifications based on race, gender, etc.),3 the Court in 
Olech “conclude[d] that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial 
for equal protection analysis.”4 The Olech Court held that “[o]ur cases have 
recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ 
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently 
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the dif-
ference.”5 Although the language in the Olech opinion suggests that the 
Court was merely reiterating longstanding equal protection jurisprudence,6 
lower federal courts began to limit Olech perhaps to satiate the fear that 
everyday disputes would “com[e] into federal court dressed as a constitu-
tional case.”7  
Lower courts have attempted to confine the class of one theory by re-
quiring that plaintiffs prove one or more of at least three additional ele-
  
 * George Mason University School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2009; Executive Editor, 
GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW, 2008-2009; Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, B.S., Economics, 
summa cum laude, May 2005. I would like to thank my wife, Crystal, for her patience and also my 
parents, Daniel and Cynthia, for their endless encouragement and support.    
 1 528 U.S. 562 (2000).  
 2 See id. at 564. See also Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech, WASH. L. REV. 367, 367-68 (2003). 
 3 Farrell, supra note 2, at 371-80.  
 4 Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  
 5 Id.  
 6 See id. at 564-65 (citing the 1923 Supreme Court case of Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota 
County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), to support the Court’s holding allowing for a class of one equal protection 
claim).  
 7 Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 632 (7th Cir. 2005); Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 
1199, 1211 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting authorities which discuss the limitations that courts have 
placed on class of one claims to lower the possibility for a federal cause of action to review decisions 
made by state actors).  
2  
ments not expressly declared by the court in Olech: (1) requiring that a 
plaintiff show that comparators, the persons to whom the plaintiff is com-
paring herself, be “prima facie identical in all relevant respects”; (2) de-
manding that plaintiffs prove that the differential treatment was a result of 
“totally illegitimate animus” or “vindictive action;” and/or (3) requiring that 
a plaintiff show a specific intent to discriminate excluding the possibility 
that the employer acted on the basis of mistake.8 These additional require-
ments have led to some incongruity among the circuits.9  
Recently, in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,10 the Su-
preme Court revisited the class of one equal protection claim—this time, in 
the context of public employment.11 In a 6-3 decision, the Engquist Court 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to create a bright-line rule holding that 
the class of one theory is inapplicable to claims brought by a public em-
ployee against his public employer.12 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s application of Olech which con-
cluded that “[w]hether to apply the class of one theory to decisions of pub-
lic employers presents a significantly different question than whether to 
apply it to legislative or regulatory acts of government.”13 However, before 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Engquist, no other court had gone as far as to 
entirely disallow Olech’s application in the context of public employment.14 
While Engquist only limited the application of Olech and the class of 
one theory in the context of public employment, post-Engquist decisions 
coming from lower federal courts have used Engquist as a stepping stone to 
further limit the scope of a class of one claim.15 These courts implement 
this limitation by first characterizing the government’s role in a particular 
claim as that resembling the role of the government as a public employer.16 
Next, the courts are able to summarily dismiss the plaintiff’s claim by hold-
ing that because the government was granted broad discretion in a certain 
context—similar to that granted in the context of public employment—the 
government enjoys a per se exclusion from a class of one equal protection 
claim.17 This Article seeks to illustrate how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Engquist has federal courts answering the wrong question regarding class of 
one equal protection claims. Unlike Engquist and its progeny, the exercise 
  
 8 Farrell, supra note 2, at 403-15.  
 9 See e.g., Bell v. Duperrault 367 F.3d 703, 709-12 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring) (de-
scribing post-Olech cases as “all over the map” and asking the Supreme Court to review its decision in 
Olech).  
 10 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).  
 11 Id. 
 12 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008). 
 13 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2007); Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153.  
 14 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1011 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2150. 
 15 See infra Part III.A.  
 16 See infra Part III.A. 
 17 See infra Part III.A. 
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should not be solely focused on the threshold characterization of the gov-
ernment’s function in a given decision. Instead, this Article argues that the 
added strictures placed on a conventional class of one claim already serve 
to limit the fear that everyday disputes will come into federal courts dis-
guised as constitutional cases. Therefore, rather than developing a complex 
scheme of per se exclusions to the class of one claim, the Engquist Court 
should have concentrated on strengthening—or weakening—the elements 
of a class of one claim that have been developing for decades now in the 
lower federal courts.18 The solution is not to admit the well-settled principal 
that the Equal Protection Clause “protect[s] persons, not groups”19 only to 
turn around and completely deny that protection to certain persons. Admit-
tedly, current class of one equal protection jurisprudence is less than en-
tirely clear, but as stated by Justice Stevens dissenting in Engquist, “the 
Court should use a scalpel rather than a meat-axe.”20 
With that, Part I provides background discussing the contours of the 
constitutional protection provided under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
the birth of the class of one theory culminating with the Supreme Court’s 
express recognition of the doctrine in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.21 
Part II.A summarizes the transformation of the Olech class of one rule by 
  
 18 Some have argued that the class of one theory and Olech are inconsistent with equal protection 
jurisprudence in its entirety. See Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and 
“Classes of One”, 89 KY. L. J. 69, 76 (2000) (concluding that the original understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause coupled with Supreme Court precedent does not support extending the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to classes of one). Additionally, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits held, prior to Olech, 
that showing membership in a class was required to state a claim. Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 
1050 (6th Cir. 1999); Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1995). In Bass v. Robin-
son, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action alleging that the defendant, a police officer, used excessive 
force in effecting the plaintiff’s arrest. Bass, 167 F.3d at 1050. The Sixth Circuit in Bass held that 
“[b]ecause the Plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a pro-
tected class, his equal protection claim fails at the inception.” Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 
456 (1962)). Next, in Herro v. City of Milwaukee, an applicant for a tavern license filed a civil rights 
action against local government officials following the denial of his application. Herro, 44 F.3d at 550-
51. Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant presented a 
plausible reason for Herro’s differential treatment, the Seventh Circuit went on to state that “[e]ven were 
we to doubt to the plausibility of defendants’ asserted reasons for decision . . . this Court is skeptical that 
Herro has established a prima facie equal protection claim. . . . A person bringing an action under the 
Equal Protection Clause must show intentional discrimination against him because of his membership in 
a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an individual.” Herro, 44 F.3d at 552 (quot-
ing New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also 
Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e see compelling reasons that the 
sundry motivations of local regulators should not be policed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution, absent the intent to harm a protected group or punish the exercise of a fun-
damental right. The sheer number of possible cases is discouraging.”). 
 19 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).  
 20 Id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 21 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  
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discussing the various limitations that federal courts have placed on the 
doctrine’s application. Next, Parts II.B, II.C, and II.D lay out the facts in 
Engquist and the arguments presented by both the Ninth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court in which both courts disavowed the application of the class 
of one theory in the context of public employment. Part III concludes by 
arguing that Engquist set the perfect stage for the Supreme Court to revisit 
Olech and further clarify class of one equal protection jurisprudence as a 
whole. Instead, Engquist has set the stage for yet more confusion among 
lower federal courts. The next time the Court is presented with this oppor-
tunity, the Court should deeply consider Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting re-
marks made in the Ninth Circuit recognizing that—no matter what the con-
text—the rational basis test employed in a class of one claim has always 
served to protect individuals “against heinous governmental conduct.”22  
I. BACKGROUND—EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE  
A. Prevention of Unreasonable Classifications Versus Protection of 
Individual Rights  
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares, 
in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”23 Although the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment appears to provide a protection against disparate treatment of 
individuals, “[i]n most contexts, the basic role of the Equal Protection 
Clause is to act as a limit on government classifications.”24 “Indeed, the 
driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
desire to end legal discrimination against blacks.”25 Therefore, heeding to 
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against unrea-
sonable classifications, a plaintiff, to state a successful claim, must first 
show that he is a member of the class allegedly affected by the legislative 
classification.26  
However, the Fourteenth Amendment has also been alternatively in-
terpreted to allow for protection of individual rights not based on member-
ship in a particular class.27 This alternative interpretation appears, at times, 
  
 22 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).   
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 24 Farrell, supra note 2, at 367.  
 25 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Zick, supra 
note 18, at 72-73.  
 26 See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 14.7, at 566-68 (3d ed. 1999).  
 27 E.g., Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.  
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to be in conflict with the traditional class-based interpretation.28 One com-
mentator has noted that “like trains riding on parallel tracks that never meet, 
the two incompatible views of equal protection do not come into direct con-
flict, but simply ignore each other.”29 Others argue that allowing claims of 
individual disparate treatment without reference to a particular class 
“brushes aside a century of equal protection jurisprudence . . . .”30 As the 
name suggests and as discussed next, the class of one theory finds its ori-
gins in the Fourteenth Amendment’s role as a protector of individual 
rights.31  
B. The Origins of the Class of One Theory 
1.  The Seventh Circuit’s Role as Architect Behind the Class of One 
Theory  
While the Supreme Court in Olech cited to its 1923 decision in Sioux 
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County to lend longstanding support for “suc-
cessful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’”32 more recent 
developments in the Seventh Circuit help to track the formation of a distinct 
class of one equal protection claim.33 In Ciechon v. City of Chicago,34 a 
discharged paramedic brought several claims against the city including a 
charge that her termination violated her right to the equal protection of the 
laws.35 Plaintiff Eva Ciechon was terminated after alleged improper con-
duct where the facts revealed that her partner and co-paramedic, Richard 
Ritt, was not terminated for the same improper conduct.36 The court in 
Ciechon held that the Equal Protection Clause protects people “against in-
tentional invidious discrimination by the state against persons similarly 
situated.”37 The court further held that the city had no rational basis for dis-
charging Ms. Ciechon while not disciplining Mr. Ritt and that “[t]his choice 
was not made out of error, neglect, or mistake.”38 The Ciechon court did not 
require any showing that Ms. Ciechon was a member of a protected class.39 
  
 28 Farrell, supra note 2, at 367.  
 29 Id.  
 30 Zick, supra note 18, at 134. See also Farrell, supra note 2, at 375-79.  
 31 See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Farrell, supra note 2, at 379.  
 32 Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.  
 33 See Farrell, supra note 2, at 385-88.  
 34 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).  
 35 Id. at 516. 
 36 See id. at 522. 
 37 Id. at 522-23 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). 
 38 Id. at 523. 
 39 See id. at 522-24. 
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Rather, Ms. Ciechon prevailed by showing that “[t]he unequal treatment of 
Ciechon and Ritt was unreasonable and arbitrary and deprived Ciechon of 
equal protection of the law.”40  
  
Next, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Esmail v. Mac-
rane,41 upheld the equal protection claim of a liquor store owner who 
claimed that the mayor violated his equal protection rights by failing to 
renew the owner’s liquor license.42 The store owner alleged that he was the 
victim of a vindictive campaign by the mayor who controlled the issuance 
of liquor licenses.43 Taking these allegations as true on appeal, the court 
stated that “[t]his is an unusual kind of equal protection case, though not an 
unprecedented kind,” that fell under the purview of the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Ciechon.44 The court stated that “[a] class of one is likely to be 
the most vulnerable of all, and we do not understand therefore why it 
should be denied the protection of the equal protection clause.”45 Therefore, 
under Esmail, a plaintiff has a successful equal protection claim by showing 
that government action “was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ him for reasons whol-
ly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.”46  
Finally and rather suitably, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Olech v. 
Village of Willowbrook47 arranged for the Supreme Court’s review and de-
finitive acknowledgment of the class of one theory as a valid claim under 
the Equal Protection Clause.48 Judge Posner, writing again for the Seventh 
Circuit, reaffirmed the court’s opinion in Esmail holding that while the 
Equal Protection Clause is more often raised by members of a protected 
class, a valid claim also existed where an individual can demonstrate that he 
is a victim of government action taken with “illegitimate animus” uncon-
nected from any justifiable government purpose.49 To summarize the under-
lying facts, the Village of Willowbrook (“Village”) demanded a 33-foot 
easement as part of an agreement to connect Grace Olech’s home to the 
municipal water supply.50 Other residents of the Village were only required 
to grant a 15-foot easement as part of the connection procedure.51 Ms. 
Olech’s complaint alleged that the Village’s purpose for the non-customary 
easement was the fact that the Olechs’ had successfully sued the Village 
 40 Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 524 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Olshock v. Vill. of Sko-
kie, 541 F.2d 1254, 1260 (7th Cir. 1976)).  
 41 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 42 Id. at 178. 
 43 Id. at 177. 
 44 Id. at 178-80. 
 45 Id. at 180.  
 46 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 47 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
 48 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
 49 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998).  
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
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several years earlier.52 Judge Posner argued that the Olechs’ were not re-
quired to show permanent depravation or an “orchestrated campaign” of 
retaliation and rather, a successful claim could be maintained by demon-
strating that the defendants took “vindictive action” against the Olechs.53 
Judge Posner recognized the problem of constitutionalizing fairly trivial 
municipal disputes.54 However, he contended that this concern would be 
satiated by requiring “proof that the cause of the differential treatment of 
which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the 
plaintiff by the defendant.”55 “[A] tincture of ill will does not invalidate 
governmental action.”56 This requirement of “illegitimate animus” is sig-
nificant to highlight because, as the next Part discusses, the Olech Court 
removed the requirement of showing any “subjective ill will” only to have 
this requirement quickly reinstated by lower federal courts.57  
2. The Supreme Court Reviews the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in 
Olech 
In a short opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Olech validating the class of one theory.58 However, dissimilar 
from Judge Posner’s reasoning at the lower level, the unanimous Supreme 
Court did not require that Ms. Olech illustrate ill-will or “illegitimate ani-
mus.”59 Instead, a plaintiff stated a successful claim “where the plaintiff 
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others simi-
larly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treat-
ment.”60 Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, recognized that the Sev-
enth Circuit’s requirement of “illegitimate animus” was intended to “mini-
mize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into 
cases of constitutional right.”61 The Supreme Court’s decision in Olech 
made it unmistakable that the Equal Protection Clause does extend to pro-
tecting individual rights unconnected from membership in a particular 
  
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 388. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).  
 56 Id.  
 57 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000). See supra note 110 and accompany-
ing text.  
 58 See id. at 564-65. 
 59 Olech, 528 U.S. at 565. 
 60 Id. at 564. 
 61 Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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class.62 However, the formation of the class of one theory is particularly 
important because, as discussed next, the Supreme Court’s nonchalant rec-
ognition of this doctrine has led some federal courts to question whether 
Olech was ever intended to significantly alter and augment equal protection 
jurisprudence.63 Lower federal courts almost immediately began to limit the 
effect of Olech by either raising the burden to prove elements expressly 
stated by the Supreme Court,64 and/or by requiring plaintiffs to prove addi-
tional elements not set forth in Olech.65  
II. THE RECEPTION OF OLECH BY THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Engquist, lower federal courts did 
not place categorical restrictions on the application of the class of one the-
ory.66 Instead, courts implemented broad limitations that applied regardless 
of whether the government was in its role as a regulator or as an em-
ployer.67 First, this Part discusses the three doctrine-wide limitations that 
have been placed on the class of one theory.68 Second, the discussion turns 
to introduce the facts in Engquist as well as the reasons set forth by the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court where both courts placed an unprece-
dented categorical restriction on the application of the class of one theory.69 
It is helpful to recall the rule in Olech to witness how the different circuits 
have altered both the vocabulary and emphasis on different elements of the 
rule: 
om others simi-
larly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.70  
  
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a “class of one,” 
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently fr
 62 See Farrell, supra note 2, at 400 n. 238 (“Although the Equal Protection Clause does not protect 
individuals from adverse affects of reasonable legislative classifications, it does protect an individual 
from an arbitrary individual administrative decision by a government official.”). 
 63 E.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007); Campagna v. Mass. 
Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 206 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2003).  
 64 See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 65 See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 66 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008); Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1011 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
 67 See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). For a detailed summary of the im-
pact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, see MICHAEL MCGUINNESS, 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION LAW 166-212 (2007). 
 68 For a further discussion on the three limitations referred to above, see Farrell, supra note 2, at 
402-15.  
 69 See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157; Engquist, 478 F.3d at 996.  
 70 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  
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A. Three Techniques Implemented by Lower Federal Courts to Limit the 
Reach of Olech  
1. Requiring that Comparators Are Prima Facie Identical 
The Supreme Court in Olech required that the plaintiff offer proof that 
comparators were “similarly situated.”71 Since Olech, courts have required 
that to prevail on a class of one claim, plaintiffs need to offer comparators 
that are more than “similarly situated.”72 Rather, the “similarity between 
plaintiffs and the persons with whom they compare themselves must be 
extremely high.”73 For example, in Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor,74 
the Seventh Circuit denied a class of one claim brought by prospective de-
velopers who relied on comparisons among three other developments to 
allege that the Village of Winthrop Harbor treated these developers more 
favorably.75 The court cited Ciechon, a Seventh Circuit case decided well 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech,76 to support the proposition 
that the plaintiff was required and failed to show that comparators were 
“identically situated in all relevant respects rationally related to the gov-
ernment’s mission.”77  
Similarly, in Neilson v. D’Angelis,78 the Second Circuit reversed a jury 
decision in favor of the plaintiff’s class of one claim holding that the plain-
tiff failed to prove, as a matter of law, that the comparators were similarly 
situated within the meaning of the class of one doctrine.79 In this case, Mr. 
Nielson, previously an armed security guard, was disciplined for improp-
erly unholstering his weapon and failing to inform his superiors that he had 
done so.80 Mr. Neilson introduced evidence that other officers were sub-
jected to lesser disciplinary measures for similar behavior.81 The court in 
Neilson reasoned that the comparators “committed offenses that some ra-
tional people might deem as or more serious than Nielson’s offense,” but 
“other rational people might regard them as less serious.”82 Therefore, the 
Neilson court required that the plaintiff show that no rational person could 
  
 71 Id.  
 72 See e.g., Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 73 Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop 
Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002)).  
 74 286 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 75 Id. at 455.  
 76 See discussion supra I.B.1.  
 77 Purze, 286 F.3d at 455.  
 78 409 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 79 Id. at 101. 
 80 Id. at 101-02. 
 81 Id. at 103. 
 82 Id. at 106. 
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have disciplined each officer differently given the nature of the offenses.83 
In Neilson, the court writes, “[t]he parties in this case, however, appear to 
assume that the standard of ‘similarity’ in ‘class of one’ cases is analogous 
to that used in cases where discrimination based on membership in a spe-
cific protected class is claimed.”84  
As another illustration of the “prima facie identical” requirement, in 
Ferguson v. City of Rochester School District,85 a teacher previously em-
ployed in a New York public school brought an action against her former 
employer alleging that her employer wrongfully rejected her request to re-
scind a certain employment contract.86 The Voluntary Employee Separation 
Agreement (“VESA”) was a cost-cutting program enacted by the school 
district which provided monetary compensation and health benefits to more 
veteran, higher-paid teachers who agreed to resign from their positions in 
the school district.87 Plaintiff Thomasina Ferguson entered into the VESA 
which required a signed notice indicating that the agreement was irrevoca-
ble.88 After signing the form on a Friday, Ms. Ferguson submitted a letter to 
the school district the following Monday wishing to rescind her decision to 
accept voluntary separation.89 The school district informed Ms. Ferguson 
that her decision was irrevocable per the terms of the agreement.90 Ms. Fer-
guson then brought a class of one equal protection action alleging that the 
school district had allowed another individual, Jeanne Nix, to rescind her 
VESA election under very similar circumstances.91  
The court’s rejection of Ms. Ferguson’s claim rested on a finding that 
she failed to show that her circumstances were “prima facie identical” to 
that of Ms. Nix, her comparator.92 Ms. Nix, who was allowed to rescind her 
agreement, provided evidence that her husband suddenly left her and she 
would suffer “severe economic hardship” given the sudden loss of financial 
support from her husband.93 To offer proof that her situation was similar to 
that of Ms. Nix’s, Ms. Ferguson alleged that: (1) on the day she signed the 
agreement, she was taking prescribed medication that affected her judg-
ment; (2) the VESA election caused similar economic hardship to that faced 
by Ms. Nix, and that Ms. Ferguson was also sick and under a significant 
amount of family duress when she signed the agreement; and (3) on the day 
she signed the agreement, Ms. Ferguson and her husband believed they 
  
 83 Id.  
 84 Neilson, 409 F.3d at 104. 
 85 485 F. Supp. 2d 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 86 Id. at 257. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. at 258. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Ferguson, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
 92 Id. at 261. 
 93 Id. at 259. 
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would be moving to Texas but plans suddenly changed.94 The court found 
that “[e]ven viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
Ferguson’s and Nix’s situations at the times of their rescission requests 
were not so similar that the District could not rationally have treated them 
differently.”95 The court noted that its task was not to find “whether Fergu-
son’s stated reasons for her request would have given the District a rational 
reason to grant it,” but rather, “[t]he issue is whether Ferguson and Nix 
were sufficiently dissimilar that the District had a rational basis for treating 
them differently.”96   
The court keyed on the fact that the departure of Ms. Nix’s husband 
was an “intervening” event suffered after Ms. Nix decided to take voluntary 
separation from employment.97 Although Ms. Ferguson’s allegation that her 
and her husband decided not to move to Texas could be characterized as an 
intervening event, the court declared that Ms. Ferguson’s deposition testi-
mony revealed that the “plaintiff simply felt far less sanguine about her 
decision” and so she changed her mind.98 So, after taking a close look at 
Purze, Neilson, and Ferguson, lower courts have continually and expressly 
recognized a difference between a plaintiff’s burden in a class of one equal 
protection claim relative to a class-based equal protection claim. The re-
quirement that plaintiffs show that comparators are “prima facie identical” 
provides the courts with an expansive technique to limit a potential class of 
one claim.99 
2. Showing a Specific Intent to Discriminate  
Olech’s application of the class of one doctrine does require that the 
plaintiff show that he was “intentionally treated different from others simi-
larly situated.”100 Taking this requirement one step further, the Second Cir-
cuit in Giordano v. City of New York,101 in the recent aftermath of Olech, 
specifically highlighted that the plaintiff must show “intentional disparate 
treatment.”102 Mr. Giordano, a police officer, sued his employer alleging 
that he was wrongfully terminated for using a blood thinner.103 In support of 
his claim, Mr. Giordano submitted evidence that the New York Police De-
partment (“Department”) continued to employ another officer, Thomas 
  
 94 Id. at 261. 
 95 Id. at 260-61. 
 96 Id. at 261. 
 97 See Ferguson, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 261.  
 98 Id. at 262. 
 99 See MCGUINNESS, supra note 67, at 201. 
 100 Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 
 101 274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 102 See id. at 751.  
 103 Id. at 742.  
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Rowe, even though the Department knew that Mr. Rowe was taking the 
same blood thinner found in Mr. Giordano’s system.104 However, the court 
rejected Mr. Giordano’s equal protection claim reasoning that he failed to 
prove that the Police Department medical unit (Unit), who was directly 
responsible for his termination, was aware that Mr. Rowe was taking the 
same blood thinner.105 Consequently, the Giordano court concluded that the 
Unit could not have levied the disparate treatment alleged by Mr. Giordano 
because the Unit was not actually aware that Mr. Rowe was also taking a 
blood thinner.106 This requirement imposes upon a plaintiff the arguably 
difficult task of proving that those responsible for the alleged disparate 
treatment were subjectively aware of any then present characteristics of the 
comparators now used by the plaintiff to illustrate disparate treatment.   
3. Proving that the Government Possessed a Subjective Ill-Will 
Perhaps the most notable limitation on class of one claims created by 
federal courts is the requirement that a plaintiff show “subjective ill will” or 
“illegitimate animus.”107 In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Olech, Judge 
Posner wrote that the class of one equal protection claim requires a showing 
of “totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.”108 In 
reviewing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the plaintiff’s allegations, “quite apart from the [defendant’s] subjective 
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim of relief under traditional equal 
protection analysis.”109 Yet, lower courts have ignored this Supreme Court 
reasoning by immediately reinstating the Seventh Circuit’s “subjective ill-
will” requirement, and continuing to apply this requirement in more recent 
cases.110  
  
 104 Id. at 751. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id.  
 107 E.g., Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We have recognized that a 
person may also state a claim under the ‘class of one’ theory by showing that . . . the cause of the differ-
ential treatment is a ‘totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.’” (quoting Olech 
v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998))); Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 709 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“While [defendant’s] alleged behavior was perhaps inconsiderate or inappropriate, it does 
not demonstrate the type of ‘deep-seated animosity’ that this Court has found to support an equal protec-
tion claim.” (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1995))); Bartell v. Aurora Public 
Schools, 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[The defendant] must show that ‘the action taken by 
the state, whether in the form of prosecution or otherwise, was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ [the defendant] 
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’” (quoting Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180)).  
 108 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 109 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000). 
 110 Almost immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, Judge Posner, in Hilton v. 
City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (2000), effectively ignored the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “sub-
jective ill-will” requirement citing to the opinion he authored in the Seventh Circuit to support a re-
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For an illustration of the stubbornness by the courts to set aside the 
subjective ill-will requirement, consider the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bar-
tell v. Aurora Public Schools.111 In Bartell, Richard Bartell, a former school 
employee, brought an equal protection claim as a result of the school dis-
trict’s investigation of sexual harassment charges against Mr. Bartell.112 
After recognizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, the Bartell court 
required that Mr. Bartell show that the alleged disparate treatment by the 
government “was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ [Bartell] for reasons wholly unre-
lated to any legitimate state objective.”113 The court denied Mr. Bartell’s 
claim by reasoning that even if the allegations of differential treatment were 
true, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the school district 
was out to “get” Mr. Bartell.114 Why did the court in Bartell require the 
plaintiff to show subjective ill-will115 when this element was expressly dis-
carded by the Supreme Court in Olech?116 The analysis by the Bartell court 
suggests more than mere confusion and instead, reflects an effort by lower 
federal courts to discourage claims which could cause over-interference 
with everyday governmental functions, while still allowing a rule to prevent 
irrational and bad-spirited governmental conduct. To recall, Justice Breyer, 
concurring in Olech, recommended that the added requirement of “subjec-
tive ill-will” would relieve “any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill 
zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.”117 
Under Olech, to state a class of one equal protection claim, a plaintiff 
was required to show that he had been “intentionally treated differently 
from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the differ-
ence in treatment.” 118 Seven years later while operationalizing the Olech 
class of one claim, courts require class of one plaintiffs to show that the 
government, possessing a specific intent coupled with subjective ill-will, 
treated the plaintiff differently from other(s) who were “prima facie identi-
cal in all relevant respects.”119 As discussed next, the Supreme Court has 
  
quirement of subjective ill-will. Id. at 1008. For a recent case requiring subjective ill-will, see St. John’s 
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 111 263 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001), overruled by Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, No. 07-
1251, 2008 WL 4149656 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2008) (recognizing that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Engquist would have precluded Mr. Bartell, a public employee, from bringing his initial claim against 
his employer).  
 112 Id. at 1144. 
 113 Id. at 1149 (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).  
 117 Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 118 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
 119 Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002). This rule was derived by 
the author by following the advice of Judge Reinhardt and employing all three techniques used to limit a 
class of one equal protection claim. See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
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confirmed that there is yet another limitation—that is, the plaintiff may not 
be a public employee bringing a claim against his public employer.120 As 
outlined supra in the Introduction, Part III argues that the Engquist Court’s 
latest limitation on a class of one claim has failed to clarify the contours of 
the class of one theory. 
B. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture: The Facts  
Plaintiff Anup Engquist was hired as an international food standards 
specialist for the Export Service Center (ESC) which is a laboratory in the 
Laboratory Services Division (LSD) housed within the Oregon Department 
of Agriculture (ODA).121 Ms. Engquist made several complaints to her su-
pervisor, Norma Corristan, about Joseph Hyatt, a named defendant and 
LSD employee.122 Ms. Corristan responded to Ms. Engquist’s complaints 
by requiring that Mr. Hyatt attend anger management and diversity train-
ing.1
licable to claims brought by public employees 
against their employer.129 
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Mr. Hyatt and John Szczepanski, an assistant director of the ODA, al-
legedly developed a plan to “get rid of” both Corristan and Engquist by 
restructuring the ESC.124 After state-wide budget cuts, Mr. Szczepanski 
eliminated Ms. Corristan’s and Ms. Engquist’s positions.125 Before Ms. 
Engquist’s trial, Ms. Corristan successfully sued the ODA, Mr. Szczepan-
ski, and Mr. Hyatt ending in a jury verdict finding that Mr. Hyatt discrimi-
nated against Ms. Corristan on the basis of race or gender violating her 
equal protection rights.126 Ms. Engquist subsequently sued the same three 
parties but instead of claiming membership in a protected class, Ms. Eng-
quist proceeded under a class of one theory of equal protection.127 Among 
other findings, the jury found for Ms. Engquist on her class of one equal 
protection claim and entered judgment in favor of Ms. Engquist awarding 
her $350,000 in damages plus attorney’s fees and costs.128 The defendants 
appealed on several grounds, one of which was defendant’s contention that 
Ms. Engquist’s class of one claim should fail at its inception because the 
doctrine should be inapp
 120 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008). 
 121 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 127 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149.  
 128 Id. at 2149-50.  
 129 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 992.  
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C. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
While the limitations discussed above have restricted successful 
claims, the Ninth Circuit decided that the uncertainty among the federal 
courts provided an opportunity to further limit the class of one equal protec-
tion claim.130 In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of 
the lower court holding that the class of one theory was inapplicable to pub-
lic employers.131 The majority began by summarizing the rule in Olech, but 
as a sign of things to come, the court immediately followed by raising the 
concerns mentioned by Justice Breyer that “Olech would transform ordi-
nary violations of state or local law into constitutional cases.”132 The court 
recognized that it had applied the class of one theory in regulatory contexts, 
but had not decided on whether the class of one theory should be “ex-
tended” to the public employment context.133 The court’s use of the word 
“extended” further revealed the direction that the majority planned to take. 
As noted by the majority themselves, no other court prior to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, including the Supreme Court in Olech, has drawn any distinction be-
tween the theory’s application in a regulatory context versus an employ-
ment context.134 The word “extended” presupposes that such distinctions 
have been drawn by other courts. The majority indicated that although other 
courts have applied the class of one theory in the context of public em-
ployment, almost no claim has ever prevailed leaving “Engquist’s thus-far 
successful claim . . . a unique case.”135 The court then made several argu-
ments for why the class of one theory should not be applied to public em-
ployment decisions.136 
First, the court recognized that a different approach must be taken in 
reviewing the government’s decisions as an employer as opposed to a regu-
lator.137 Quoting the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “the gov-
ernment as an employer indeed has far broader powers than does the gov-
ernment as a sovereign.”138 The court further argued that the government 
has limited the constitutional rights of its employees in the First Amend-
ment context and the Fourth Amendment context to “balance the govern-
  
 130 Id. at 996.  
 131 Id. at 990. 
 132 Id. at 992-93. (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565-66 (2000)).  
 133 Id. at 993. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994 & n.2.  
 136 Id. at 994-96. 
 137 Id. at 994. 
 138 Id. at 994 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (discussing the government’s ability to limit free speech of its employees to efficiently carry 
out public services)). 
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ment employer’s legitimate interest in its mission.”139 Consistent with this 
notion, the Engquist court stated that “[t]he class-of-one theory of equal 
protection is another constitutional area where the rights of public employ-
ees should not be as expansive as the rights of ordinary citizens.”140 Sec-
ondly, the Engquist majority reasoned that allowing judicial review of the 
actions of public employers frustrated the idea of government at-will em-
ployment.141 Third, the majority stated that “when a public employee is 
subjected to unequal treatment at work for arbitrary reasons, the need for 
federal judicial review under equal protection is ‘especially thin’ given the 
number of other legal protections that public employees enjoy.”142 Fourth, 
the majority warned against the “flood of new cases” that would arise if 
federal courts were required to review everyday decisions made by gov-
ernment employers.143 Lastly, the majority closed by stating that “Olech is 
too slender a reed on which to base such a transformation of public em-
ployment law.”144  
Judge Reinhardt raised three basic arguments in his dissenting opinion: 
(1) the majority’s holding created inter-circuit conflict; (2) the holding is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent; and (3) the majority’s policy 
concerns did not justify the holding.145 Justice Reinhardt argued that neither 
the Ninth Circuit nor any other circuit has placed a categorical restriction on 
the application of the class of one theory or limited the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of public employees.146 Also, he commented that the majority 
was “needlessly concerned that the class of one rule would eliminate at-will 
employment.”147 Judge Reinhardt contended that regardless of the class of 
one theory, the decisions of public employers have always been insulated 
by the rational basis test and as a result, the review of decisions made in 
regards to at-will employees would not change.148 Finally, the dissenting 
judge recommended that the best approach to decide class of one claims 
was to apply three overlapping limitations previously applied by the federal 
courts: (1) identically situated comparators, (2) a high burden of disproving 
  
 139 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994-95 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006)).  
 140 Id. at 995.  
 141 Id. (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1975); Andrews v. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972)). To further support this proposition, the Engquist court 
quoted the Supreme Court stating “an at-will government employee . . . generally has no claim based on 
the Constitution at all.” Engquist, 278 F.3d at 995 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679 
(1994) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). 
 142 Id. (quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 996. 
 145 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1010-14 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. at 1011-12.  
 147 Id. at 1012-13. 
 148 Id.  
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any rational basis or mistake, and (3) an illegitimate animus or malice.149 
However, Judge Reinhardt added that in cases involving malice, the em-
ployee need not provide a comparator identical in all relevant respects be-
cause “the government does not ordinarily treat people maliciously, and, 
thus, is obviously treating individuals unequally under such circum-
stances.”150  
D. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
On January 11, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Engquist.151 In a 6-3 decision issued on June 
9, 2008, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision holding that a 
class-of-one equal protection claim is not cognizable in the context of pub-
lic employment.152 The Court did not “quarrel with the premises of Eng-
quist’s argument. . . . [that] [i]t is well settled that the Equal Protection 
Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups, and that the Clause’s protections 
apply to administrative as well as legislative acts.”153 But, the Court rea-
soned that its “traditional view of the core concern of the Equal Protection 
Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications, combined with the 
unique considerations applicable when the government acts as employer as 
opposed to sovereign” yields that a class of one theory of equal protection 
does not apply in the context of public employment.154  
The majority echoed many of the arguments made by the Ninth Circuit 
focusing on two main reasons to support its holding: (1) the “government 
has significantly greater leeway in its dealing with citizen employees than it 
does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large”;155 and 
(2) employment decisions are inherently subjective unlike legislative or 
regulatory classifications such as was the case in Olech.156 The Court stated 
that “[i]t is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, indi-
vidualized decision that it was subjective and individualized.”157 Also, simi-
lar to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Court recognized that allowing 
Engquist’s claim to move forward was at odds with the basic principle of 
at-will employment “that an employee may be terminated for a ‘good rea-
  
 149 Id. at 1013. See also discussion supra II.A. 
 150 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013.  
 151 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 977 
(2008).  
 152 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008).  
 153 Id. at 2150 (internal citations omitted) (citing Adarand Constructor, Inc. v Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995).  
 154 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2151.  
 155 Id. at 2151. 
 156 Id. at 2153-54. 
 157 Id. at 2154. 
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son, bad reason, or no reason at all. . . . [A] government’s decision to limit 
the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act of legislative grace, 
not constitutional mandate.”158  
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined dis-
senting, argued that it was incorrect and unnecessary to carve out this ex-
ception from a public employees’ constitutional rights.159 The dissent ar-
gued that the outcome of Olech “was not determined by the size of the dis-
advantaged class . . . [or] the fact that the Village was discriminating 
against a property owner rather than an employee . . . [and] [r]ather, the 
outcome of Olech was dictated solely by the absence of a rational basis for 
the discrimination.”160 Further, to negate the importance the majority placed 
on preserving “at will” employment, the dissent recognized that “recent 
constitutional decisions and statutory enactments have all but nullified the 
significance of the doctrine . . . . [so that] preserving the remnants of ‘at-
will’ employment provides a feeble justification for creating a broad excep-
tion to a well-established category of constitutional protections.”161 Finally, 
similar to Judge Reinhardt’s opinion, Justice Stevens points out that class of 
one claims are brought infrequently, and usually unsuccessfully, so that 
there is no threat of a multitude of these claims suddenly coming into fed-
eral court.162  
III. AND THE WRONG RULE BEGINS TO CREATE MORE WRONG RULES 
Even Judge Posner, a principal architect of the class of one theory,163 
has stated that “the fact that the post-Olech cases are all over the map sug-
gests a need for the Court to step in and clarify its ‘cryptic’ per curiam deci-
sion [in Olech].”164 Engquist provided the Court with this opportunity but 
instead of clarification, we received a misplaced effort that approaches the 
class of one doctrine from the wrong direction. In his dissent in Engquist, 
Justice Stevens wrote that “[e]ven if some surgery were truly necessary to 
prevent governments from being forced to defend a multitude of equal pro-
tection ‘class of one’ claims, the Court should use a scalpel rather than a 
meat-axe.”165 Analyzing three cases decided immediately after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Engquist, Part III.A sets out to illustrate that lower 
courts have followed the Court’s lead by using the same meat-axe to incor-
  
 158 Id. at 2155-56. 
 159 Id. at 2157 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 160 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 161 Id. at 2160. 
 162 Id. at 2160-61; Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1013 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, 
J., dissenting).  
 163 See Farrell, supra note 2, at 385.  
 164 Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 165 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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rectly expand per se exclusions to class of one claims. Next, Part III.B con-
cludes by arguing that while courts may be correct in surrendering rela-
tively large leeway to governmental conduct in certain contexts, the rational 
basis test has always shielded review of highly discretionary government 
conduct. For that reason, although we should expect continued evolution of 
the rational basis test as applied to class of one equal protection claims, it’s 
unnecessary and incorrect to continue creating a plethora of new substan-
tive rules excluding certain plaintiffs from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection against irrational and unequal treatment by the government.    
A. Life After Engquist 
1. Siao-Pao v. Connolly 
In Siao-Pao v. Connolly,166 a case from the Southern District of New 
York, Leopold Siao-Pao, incarcerated for second-degree murder and first-
degree robbery, sought habeas relief following a denial of parole.167 Siao-
Pao challenged the Parole Board’s decision on several grounds, one of 
which was that the Parole Board violated his equal protection rights.168 To 
support his equal protection claim, Siao-Pao offered three comparators.169 
Particularly, Siao-Pao compared himself to Kathy Boudin who received a 
similar sentence for a similar conviction but was granted parole.170 After 
analyzing Siao-Pao’s equal protection claim under the test of selective en-
forcement and the class of one doctrine, the Siao-Pao court found that his 
claim failed under both theories.171  
As to the class of one claim, the Siao-Pao court recognized that the 
Second Circuit “interpreted the Olech standard to require that differential 
treatment be both intentional and irrational to satisfy the class of one stan-
dard.”172 Citing Engquist, the Siao-Pao court goes on to state that “the Su-
preme Court recently clarified the Olech holding by limiting class of one 
claims in contexts characterized by individualized and subjective determi-
nations where ‘allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a 
particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state offi-
cials are entrusted to exercise . . . . [The Parole Board’s decision] is discre-
tionary, as was the decision in Engquist, where the Supreme Court rejected 
a class of one argument and accorded deference to the state’s determination 
  
 166 564 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 167 Id. at 240.  
 168 Id. at 244. 
 169 Id. at 245-46. 
 170 Id.  
 171 Id.  
 172 Siao-Pao, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 246. 
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based on the subjective and individualized nature of the decision.’”173 So, 
less than a month after the Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist, a new test 
appears to be emerging.174 Now, at least in the Southern District of New 
York, the court will look first to whether the government’s decision is the 
type that is individualized and subjective.175 If so, the court warns potential 
claimants like Siao-Pao that “[g]iven the numerous factors considered by 
the Parole Board,” it is doubtful that any claimant will be able to demon-
strate irrational and wholly arbitrary acts and intentional disparate treat-
ment.176 Thus, the Siao-Pao court quickly took Engquist as a sign that the 
Supreme Court may not object to further categorical restrictions to the ap-
plication of the class of one theory—outside of the public employment con-
text—so long as the decision can be characterized as individualized and 
subjective.  
2. Douglas Asphalt, Co. v. Qore, Inc. 
Soon after Engquist, in Douglas Asphalt, Co. v. Qore, Inc.,177 the Elev-
enth Circuit quickly adopted and expanded the reasoning of Engquist to 
place another categorical restriction on class of one equal protection 
claims.178 In Douglas Asphalt, a government contractor brought a class of 
one claim against Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”) offi-
cials alleging that he was intentionally treated differently than other paving 
contractors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.179 After asserting 
that Douglas’s performance on two previous repaving projects was inade-
quate, the GDOT awarded a third contract to the second lowest bidder in-
stead of Douglas who was the lowest bidder.180 Douglas countered the 
GDOT’s charge by claiming that the test utilized by the GDOT finding 
  
 173 Id. at 245 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric. 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008)). 
 174 Siao-Pao was decided on June 25, 2008. The Supreme Court decided Engquist on June 9, 2008.  
 175 An unpublished decision from the Eastern District of New York reveals similar reasoning. 
Analytical Diagnostics Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, No. 07-3908, slip op. at **3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008). 
Regardless of the other serious factual issues raised by plaintiff as to different treatment and 
defendants' motivations, the undisputed fact remains that [Department of Health] officials 
possess discretion to subjectively evaluate laboratories and make licensing decisions, and any 
differential treatment of [Analytical Diagnostics Labs] stemmed from these discretionary ac-
tivities. As the Engquist Court noted, a plaintiff cannot raise a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to a necessarily subjective and individualized decision made by state officials. Plaintiff 
has failed to allege a federal equal protection violation based on defendants' exercise of dis-
cretion as [Department of Health] employees. 
Id. at *5 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
 176 Siao-Pao, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 245..  
 177 541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 178 Id.  
 179 Id. at 1271-72.  
 180 Id.  
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Douglas’s work inadequate was inaccurate and false.181 In dismissing 
Douglas’s class of one claim, the Douglas Asphalt court relied heavily on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist.182 The court extensively quoted 
the Engquist majority and had “little trouble applying the reasoning in 
Engquist, directed at [sic] the government-employment relationship, to the 
circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship. . 
. . Just as in the employee context, and in the absence of a restricting con-
tract or statute, decisions involving government contractors require broad 
discretion that may rest ‘on a wide array of factors that are difficult to ar-
ticulate and quantify.’”183  
  
3. Vassallo v. Lando 
As the last example, in Vassallo v. Lando,184 school administrators, 
following a bathroom fire, claimed that they had reason to believe that the 
eleventh grade plaintiff started the fire. With this belief, the administrators 
interviewed the plaintiff and sought consent from the plaintiff to conduct a 
search.185 Following this activity by the administrators, the plaintiff brought 
a class of one claim, among other claims, asserting that the administrators 
improperly singled out the plaintiff for questioning without a rational basis 
for doing so in violation of his right to equal protection.186 In granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on the class of one claim, the court held 
that “[a]s a threshold matter, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. County Comm’n of Web-
ster County would foreclose a ‘class of one’ claim by plaintiff in connection 
with the discretionary decision by school administrators in this case as to 
whether a student should be interviewed and searched for evidence of 
criminal activity.”187 The Vasallo court likened the facts in the case to the 
traffic ticket hypothetical offered by the Engquist majority and concluded 
that “[the school administrators] must have the leeway to single out certain 
students for questioning when a disciplinary situation arises.”188 Therefore, 
 181 Id. at 1272.  
 182 Id. at 1271-72.  
 183 Douglas Asphalt, Co., 541 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 
2146, 2154 (2008). The Douglas court also agreed with the alternative argument of the GDOT officials 
that Douglas had failed to sufficiently allege similarly situated comparators as required for a class of one 
claim. Id.   
 184 No. 06-CV-2520, 2008 WL 4855826 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008). 
 185 Id. at **2-4. 
 186 Id. at *8. 
 187 Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted). 
 188 Id. at *10 (emphasis added). The Vasallo court, because the Second Circuit had not yet ruled 
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under Vasallo, it appears that school administrators in a large part of New 
York need not worry that their “discretion” may at times be subject to ra-
tional basis review by the courts.  
B. The Scalpel and Not the Meat-axe 
In Engquist, not only did the State fail to offer any explanation for 
why Ms. Engquist was terminated, the State also “explicitly disclaimed the 
existence of any workplace or performance-based rationale.”189 The State 
likely took this stance because, as the jury ultimately determined, the State 
could not come up with a rational justification for terminating Ms. Eng-
quist. In fact, the State entered this case with a slight disadvantage given 
that a separate jury had already found that Mr. Hyatt, also Ms. Engquist’s 
supervisor, unlawfully discriminated against Ms. Corristan, a friend and co-
worker of Ms. Engquist.190 Although this finding of unlawful discrimination 
was based on gender or ethnicity, the State and Mr. Hyatt entered the Eng-
quist case with something less than clean hands. So rather than argue this 
case on the merits, the State sought and obtained an exception for decisions 
made by public employers. Now, the Engquist rule and its subsequent ex-
pansion threatens to improperly weaken rational basis review while failing 
to offer sufficient justification for doing so.  
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, wrote that “[t]he ra-
tional basis test has always been used to insulate government decisions 
from searching review that would interfere with governmental functions, 
while still protecting individuals against heinous governmental conduct.”191 
Similarly, Justice Stevens’s dissent reminds us that “[o]ur decision in Vil-
lage of Willowbrook v. Olech, applied a rule that had been an accepted part 
of our equal protection jurisprudence for decades: Unless state action that 
intentionally singles out an individual, or a class of individuals, for adverse 
treatment is supported by some rational justification, it violates the Four-
teenth Amendment’s command that no state shall ‘deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’”192 Here, Justice Stevens 
and Judge Reinhardt are simply reciting the relatively unremarkable propo-
sition that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all treatment at the hands 
of the State, and should protect individuals against unequal and irrational 
governmental conduct. The question is then how does the Engquist major-
ity, in finding an exception to rational basis review for public employers, 
  
of the plaintiff’s class of one claim finding that the plaintiff, regardless of a per se exclusion, had failed 
to meet the relatively robust similarly situated element of a class of one claim. Id. at *11.  
 189 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2159 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 190 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 191 Id. at 1012 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
 192 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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sidestep this central premise of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, consis-
tent with Justice Stevens and Judge Reinhardt, the majority stated:  
When those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference, to assure that all persons 
subject to legislation or regulation are indeed being “treated alike, under like circumstances 
and conditions.”  
Thus, when it appears that an individual is being singled out by the government, the specter 
of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a “rational 
basisfor the difference in treatment.”193 
However, the majority goes on to recognize that “although government 
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their 
positions, those rights must be balanced against the realities of the em-
ployment context.”194 In reality though, the balance ultimately struck by 
Engquist was to deny a constitutional right to rational basis review when a 
public employee accepts their position. In addition to the three traditional 
levels of review afforded by the courts—i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and rational basis review195—Engquist creates a fourth level of 
“non-review” for decisions made by government employers. And, the nega-
tive effects of Engquist don’t end there.  
The Engquist majority stated that “[i]t is no proper challenge to what 
in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective 
and individualized.”196 This language has been taken as an opportunity by 
the lower federal courts to characterize an increasing amount of govern-
mental conduct as “subjective and individualized.”197 In just four short 
months after the Engquist decision, we are witnessing how courts are less 
worried with the public employment exclusion per se, and rather the courts 
need only find that the government’s decision was more like a public em-
ployment decision and less like the regulatory decision found in Olech. 
Now, under Engquist, a grant of broad discretion to the government in a 
certain context equates to endless discretion as it relates to class of one 
equal protection analysis. In order to avoid rational basis review, the gov-
ernment appears to have every incentive to both characterize its discretion 
as overly broad as well as develop less standards by which to assess its 
conduct.  
Mentioned by Judge Reinhardt and expanded upon here, rational basis 
review has always contained a mechanism to prevent “searching review that 
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(2000)). 
 194 Id. at 2152. 
 195 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 813-15 (1964).  
 196 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.  
 197 See supra text accompanying notes 166-188. 
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would interfere with governmental functions.”198 In determining the ration-
ality of a certain decision, the court must necessarily look at the discretion 
the government was initially afforded to make that decision. The majority’s 
trouble with the insulation already provided to government decisions under 
rational basis review is captured by the majority’s grim prediction that by 
“allowing class-of-one claims to go forward . . . governments will [still] be 
forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and courts 
will be obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in 
a haystack.”199 First, the Court should have been more careful in limiting an 
otherwise valid constitutional claim merely because plaintiffs may have a 
tough time proving that a certain government decision was arbitrary. For 
example, the defense of selective prosecution, based upon equal protection 
considerations, is extremely difficult to prove given that prosecutors have 
traditionally enjoyed almost unfettered discretion in deciding whom to 
charge.200 However, unlike Engquist which created a categorical exception 
to the application of the class of one theory, courts that have analyzed selec-
tive prosecution claims have heightened the burden that defendants must 
meet to sustain a successful claim.201 Before Engquist, as discussed in depth 
supra Part II.A, courts took a similar approach to that in selective prosecu-
tion claims by implementing broad limitations that applied to any class of 
one claim regardless of its context. Second, the evidence simply doesn’t 
support the Court’s dismal prediction that the federal docket will soon be-
come overcrowded with class of one claims brought by public employees or 
any other plaintiffs for that matter. The majority does not offer any specific 
evidence that would suggest an astronomical increase in class of one claims 
since Olech, but Justice Stevens does provide evidence to the contrary: 
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case, “class of one” claims arising in the public-
employment context were permitted by every court that was presented with one. Yet there 
have been only approximately 150 cases-both in district courts and the courts of appeals-
addressing such claims since Olech.202 
And finally, as to the Court’s discontent with searching for the “proverbial 
needle in a haystack,”203 Engquist may have been just that needle in a hay-
stack consistent with the jury’s finding that Plaintiff Anup Engquist was 
deserving of relief.204 Instead and as it stands currently, at least government 
employers, government contractors, public school students, and those pos-
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sibly facing parole hearings can expect to be precluded from having a hear-
ing on the merits for a class of one equal protection claim.205 The list of 
those immune from a class of one equal protection claim is sure to expand 
without further guidance from the Court. For now, at least some govern-
ment actors are free to make discretionary decisions without offering any 
reasonably conceivable rational justification for doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
What makes Engquist a big case is the fact that subsequent application 
of the Engquist holding has revealed that the effect of the decision will have 
a much greater, and possibly unanticipated, effect on equal protection juris-
prudence in its entirety. Taking into account how much discretion a particu-
lar government actor has been granted, this Article set out to demonstrate 
that certain State actors should not be excluded from providing at least 
some conceivable explanation for the course of action taken. The Engquist 
Court’s unwarranted focus on judicial economy unnecessarily chipped 
away at the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment—namely, 
that plaintiffs such as Anup Engquist, at a minimum, should be able to ob-
tain recovery where the State’s actions are shown to be completely arbitrary 
and irrational. 
 205 See supra text accompanying notes 166-188. 
